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I
LAW AND THE CHURCHES IN AMERICA:
the presumption of Christian Disunity
The uneasiness in the churches in America about their division and
disunity has reached a stage that portends crucial issues for the law. To
anyone who does not believe in God, the guilt so evident among the
churches because of their separation from each other must seem a bit
ironical. The churches in the nation have never been more populated,
more prosperous, more popular.1 The people have never been more
inclined to support, whatever the reasons, a multiplicity of churches and
sects and seances and religious sciences.2 The politicians and the legis-
lators have never thought more positively, albeit never less critically,
of religion, and "spiritual values," and even of the name of God.3
A. The Concern for Unity among the Churches
Though it appears that religious societies of almost any sort could
survive and thrive at the present time, it is the churches which are the
largest in communicant strength and the most important in economic
resources and political influence and national status-those in a sense
most able to survive on their own-who bespeak the most sober concern
for the recovery of the unity of the Church.
The most publicized expression of that concern recently has been,
of course, the call of Pope John XXIII for an Ecumenical Council to
consider in some fashion not yet disclosed the separations between the
Roman Church and other communions. The size and cohesion of the
Roman Catholic Church in the United States makes the prospective
deliberations of the Ecumenical Council of enormous significance to all
the churches in America.
Even more recently, in conjunction with the celebration of the
450th anniversary of the birth of John Calvin, "Reformed and Presby-
terian leaders, over the world called . . . for a drive toward Christian
unity that in time could end the separatism Calvin did so much to bring
about."4 This appeal, which had the concurrence of American Presby-
*Member of the New York Bar; special counsel to the Episcopal Diocese of
New York.
1 See YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN CHURCHES FOR 1959 (Landis ed. 1958).
2Massachusetts Council of Churches Study Group Draft Statement 4 (June
1957).
3 PFEFFER, The Case for Separation, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 78 (1958).
4 N.Y. Times, June 1, 1959, p. 34, col. 4.
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terian leaders, was addressed to all the churches, Roman Catholic to
Pentecostal, and apparently, therefore, contemplates conversations with
churches which do not adhere to presbyterial polity.
Since the formation of the World Council of Churches, the Protes-
tant, Anglican, and Orthodox member churches of the Council in the
United States have been dealing with some of the specific issues of
their disunity relating to both the doctrine of the faith and the govern-
ment of the church.5
The last thirty years have witnessed a number of mergers of
denominations, especially where divisions have been more a matter of
sociology than either doctrine or polity. In 1931, for example, the
Congregational Christian Churches were constituted of the Congre-
gational Church, with its origins in Pilgrim New England, and the
Christian Church, a denomination which began in the revivals of the
late eighteenth century in the mid-west. 6 In 1939, the Methodist
Church, which like some other bodies had been divided in the Civil War,
reunited.' The Reformed Church in the United States and the
Evangelical Synod of North America united as the Evangelical and
Reformed Church in 1934.'
The concern among the major denominations for the reunion of
the Church has been serious, but not always amiable. Where efforts
toward union have attempted to deal with differences in ecclesiastical
polity, the debilitating factionalism of Christian disunity has been ex-
posed. Unmindful evidently of the admonition of the Apostle Paul
that "to have law suits at all with one another is defeat for you,"
factions disputing polity have resorted to the civil courts to try to bar
reunion.' When the Congregational Christian Churches and the Evan-
gelical and Reformed Church, both denominations the results of former
mergers, negotiated a plan of union in spite of the differences in the
polities of the two groups, a faction in the Congregational Christian
denomination brought suit in New York to prevent the union.
10
When the concern for unity is pressed with such seriousness that
fundamental differences have to be faced, the temptation for the
5 See 1 MAN'S DISORDER AND GOD'S DESIGN 177-99 (1949). The most recent
deliberations on the disunity of the churches in the United States took place in
1957 at the North American Conference on Faith and Order. THE NATURE OF
THE UNITY ,VE SEEK (Minear ed. 1958). The official reaction of the Central
Committee of the World Council of Churches to the Ecumenical Council proposed
by Pope John XXIII is reported in IS EcUMIIENICAL COURIER 1-2 (January-February
1959).
0 MEAD, HANDBOOK OF DENO'MINATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 73-77 (1956).
71 d. at 145-52.
8 Id. at 94-96.
9 1 Corinthians 6:7.
10 See Cadman Memorial Congregational Society of Brooklyn v. Kenyon,
192 Misc. 124, 95 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct.), re'd, 279 App. Div. 1015, 111 N.Y.S.2d
808, aff'd, 306 N.Y. 151, 116 N.E.2d 481 (1953).
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churches has been to look to the law to preserve their disunity.11
B. The Historicity of American Law
It is a common observation, as Leo Pfeffer says, "to note that the
Constitution is a living document," which, along with the Bill of
Rights, remains "viable and vigorous" because it "can be reinterpreted
to meet the needs of contemporary generations."' 12 The same is es-
sential to the maturity and wisdom of statutory law, especially, perhaps,
where statutory law deals with matters closely related to constitutional
provisions. Law needs to listen to history, not only to recollect what
happened in the past, nor to enshrine the needs and prejudices of
ancestors, but also to be responsive to contemporary life, and to esteem
the present necessities. Where the law is static or abstract it becomes
both obsolete and superstitious.
The laws of the states dealing with religious societies are under
constraint to uphold the separation of church and state and the free
exercise of religion.' 3 The conception of separation and religious liberty
is rooted deeply in the history of early America and in the history of the
multiplication of denominations in this country. Recalling both is es-
sential to an appraisal of law and polity in the light of the renewed
concern for the reunion of the Church. But the matter does not end
there: the contemporary situation among the churches and the nature of
the unity the churches seek, as well as the factions in society which have
no church, must be taken into account.
C. Law and Religious Pluralism in the Colonies
In colonial America church and state were not separated. In the
charter colonies in New England, which had substantial freedom in
managing their internal affairs, the Congregational Churches became
the legal establishment.' 4 The New England Puritans were perhaps
most influenced in their principle of joinder of church and state by
Calvin's plan for theocratic government in Geneva, but there was also
the influence of the Anglican heritage.' 5
In the middle and southern colonies, which were managed by pro-
prietary boards in England commissioned by the Crown, the established
church was the Church of England.' 6 Yet there was no pretension of
theocratic government in the Anglican establishment. Establishment
just meant tax support of the church and the clergy.' The view of
some scholars is that the more liberal establishment in the colonies which
had, paradoxically, the least political freedom from England, is attribut-
11 Ibid. See N.Y. Times, June 19, 1959, p. 14, col. 1.
12 PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 54.
13 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
14 SPERRY, RELIGION IN AMERICA 31-32 (1945) [hereinafter cited as SPERRY].
15Id. at 33-34.
16 Id. at 35.
17 Ibid. Cf. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 74-76.
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able mainly to economics. Dean Willard Sperry points out that when
the influx of English settlers began to diminish, the proprietary colonies
needed settlers regardless of their religious beliefs and recruited them
from among persecuted sectarians on the Continent."8 In 1691, when
Virginia sought a charter in England for the College of William and
Mary, it was represented to the Lord of the Treasury that, just as
Massachusetts had Harvard, Virginia needed a seminary for the training
of ministers and the saving of souls. The Lord of the Treasury is
reported to have replied, "Souls! Damn your souls; make tobacco."'
0
Somewhat later, in 1750, the issue arose in Virginia of the recognition
of the Presbyterians in the colony. The established church opposed
recognition, but the Lords of Trade in London told the Council of
Virginia:
A free exercise of religion . . . is essential to . . . enriching
and improving a Trading Nation, it should ever be held sacred
in His Majesties Colonies. We must therefore recommend
it to your care, that nothing be done which can in the least
affect that great point."0
The liberal establishment of Virginia and the theocracy of Massa-
chusetts were the two chief precedents in church-state policy in the
colonies, but the situation of those persecuted for religious belief or
suffering civil disabilities because of religious dissent should be noted.
Exiles, mainly non-conforming Puritans, from the charter colonies in
New England founded the Naragansett Bay colony. 2' And though they
boasted of religious freedom, they had little toleration of Roman Catho-
lics. 2 2 Catholics migrated to Maryland, while the Quakers, who appear
to have been the only ones who actually suffered execution for their
beliefs, had their asylum in Pennsylvania.23
Economic necessity, diversity of nationality among the settlers, the
multiplication of sects through migration and, because of persecution in
the colonies, the emergence of indigenous nationalism in the Revolution
-the entanglement of such factors as these set the stage for the
separation of church and state in America.
D. Law and Religious Pluralism in the United States
By 1775 establishment was formally the case in three of the
New England colonies, in four counties of New York and five southern
colonies. The New England establishments were Congregational, the
rest Anglican. 24 Any attempt at a policy of establishment in the new
1 8 SPERRY 35.
'D id. at 36.
20 Id. at 37.
21 Id. at 33-34; see MECKLIN, THE STORY OF AMERICAN DISSENT (1934).
2 2 SPERRY 35-36.
2 3 Id. at 38; see BERRY, The Society of Friends in America (Quakers) in
THE AMERICAN CHURCH OF THE PROTESTANT HERITAGE 225-48 (Ferm ed. 1953).
24 SPERRY 50.
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nation could only have been advanced by one or the other of these
churches, and neither was strong enough to prevail in that in the Con-
gress. Neither would have agreed to recognize the other, anyway, it
appears.2
5
Moreover, the sentiment against establishment was strong among
the leaders in the making of the Constitution. George Washington
was anxious that America "never again . . . see . . . religious disputes
carried to such a pitch as to endanger the peace of society." 26 Jefferson
authored the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and its prec-
edent in abolishing religious tests for public office was followed in the
Constitution.2" Madison proposed the Bill of Rights with the First
Amendment policy of no establishment and religious liberty.
28
Though separation of church and state was the federal policy,
with the adoption of the Bill of Rights, establishment remained in some
states until 1833. Significantly, it expired then in Massachusetts because
of schism between Congregationalists who confessed the Trinity and
the Unitarians: the Trinitarians finally refused to pay taxes to support
the schismatics.
2 9
By the time the last vestages of establishment in the states had
been ended, new forces were at work in the expansion and settlement
of the nation which abetted the multiplication of denominations as,
indeed, Madison anticipated when he said, "In a free government the
security for religious rights consists in a multiplicity of sects.""0 The
definitive analysis of the forces spawning the fragmentation of the
Church in America is The Social Sources of Denominationalism by
H. Richard Niebuhr. Dr. Niebuhr points out these factors: (1) the
stratification of the Church according to economic class and the control
of property, (2) the impact of nationalism and of immigration dividing
the Church in America according to foreign origin, (3) the significance
of sectionalism at first in the conquest and settlement of the continent
and later in the growth of provincialism and sectional churches, (4) the
racial division and segregation of the churches.
3
'
The interplay and the power of these influences in the multipli-
cation of denominations in America are what, according to Dr. Nie-
buhr, the churches must confront in any serious search for unity.
The evil of denominationalism lies in the conditions which
make the rise of sects desirable and necessary: in the failure
of the churches to transcend the social conditions which
fashion them into caste-organizations, to sublimate their
25 Ibid.
2 6 PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 60.
27 Id. at 69; cf. SPERRY 4445.
2 8 PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 61.
29 SPERRY 45-46.
30 d. at 54.
31 H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF DENOMINATIONALISM (1957).
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loyalties to standards and institutions only remotely relevant if
not contrary to the Christian ideal, to resist the temptation of
making their own self-preservation and extension the primary
object of their endeavor.3"
Denominationalism represents, Dr. Niebuhr argues, "the moral
failure of Christianity."
It would not be true to affirm that the denominations are not
religious groups with religious purposes, but it is true that they
represent the accommodation of religion to the caste system.
They are emblems, therefore, of the victory of the world over
the church, of the secularization of Christianity, of the
church's sanction of that divisiveness which the church's
gospel condemns.
33
Calculations of the extent of denominationalism in the United
States at the present time vary because of differences in reporting tech-
nique and the like, but by any calculation the separatism of the churches
is staggering. Dr. Frank Mead figures that there are nearly 100,000,000
members of 295,000 local churches in 266 distinct denominations and
sects at the present time. 4 Mr. Madison would, I suppose, be pleased,
but the issue for the churches is that Saint Paul would be scandalized.3 5
E. Law and Polity: Appeasement or Preference?
The simplest interpretation of the American policy of separation
and religious liberty is that such is the only practical accommodation
that could be made to the diversity of churches when the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights were adopted. And the obvious corollary to that
is that the appeasement of denominationalism is extraordinarily more
necessary today. Toleration is supposed to be the adjustment between
pluralism and freedom in a democratic society.3" Neutralism is the
guarantee of freedom of religion. Among a host of others, such was
the observation of Lord Bryce:
It is accepted as an axiom by all Americans that civil power
ought to be not only neutral and impartial as between different
forms of faith, but ought to leave these matters entirely on
one side, regarding them no more than it regards the artistic
or literary pursuits of the citizens. There seems to be no two
opinions on this subject in the United States.3"
32 Id. at 21.
33 Id. at 25.
34 MEAn, op. cit. supra note 6, at 217-24. Another computation, using 1957
as the reporting year, computes over 104,000,000 members of 306,893 congregations
in 255 denominations. YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN CHURCHES FOR 1959 288 (Landis ed.
1958).
35 See Ephesians 4:1-6; cf. Colossians 3:12-15, and Romans 12:3-8.
36 See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, .A Note on Pluralism, in RELIGION IN AMERICA
42-50 (1958).
37 2 BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 766 (3d ed. 1894).
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American religious life and the policy of the law toward the
churches, it is true, has been and, on the whole, is, as Dean Sperry
describes it, "rankly individualistic."3  In his celebrated letter to the
Danbury Baptists, Thomas Jefferson-who refused to join a church-
wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God, that he owes account to none other
for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of
government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contem-
plate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should "make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation
between church and state.3 9
But it is not supportable that this view is neutralism toward
religious belief. It is, on the contrary, an article of the peculiar the-
ology of Protestant dissent. It represents a preference in the law for a
particular theology and, for that matter, for a specific polity. That is a
polity which, I suggest, prizes disaffection and disunity in the churches,
and the polity most gravely threatened -by the prospect of the reunion
of the Church. In short, a presumption in favor of Christian disunity
is embodied in the law.
Mark De Wolfe Howe has said that the policy in the law of
separation and religious freedom rests on theological presuppositions in-
consistent with real neutrality among denominations.
Those who support the thesis that each man should be left
free by government to follow the faith which his mind and
heart prefer, very generally, if not invariably, have in religion,
abandoned the belief that an ultimate truth has been revealed
for all . . . (this thesis) generally bespeaks a Protestant, and
very frequently a skeptical, attitude toward the 'truths' of
religion.40
Leo Pfeffer points out that the concept of separation and religious
liberty united two forces in America, the same forces suggested by
Howe as Protestant and skeptical, namely Protestant dissent and secular
humanism.4 He cites the advocacy of separation on theological grounds
by Roger Williams, among several other early Baptist leaders. For
example, John Leland of Virginia wrote that "government has no more
to do with religious opinions of men than with the principles of mathe-
38 SPERRY 9.
39 PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (1943).
40 KATZ, The Case for Religious Liberty, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 113 (1958).
41 PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 61; on the liaison of piety and secularism
in democracy in America, see REINHOLD NIEBUHR, PIOUS AND SECULAR AMERICA
1-13 (1958).
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matics," a statement which seems not to have been borne out either in
the realm of religion or mathematics.
42
That religion is a private affair, radically individualistic, is perhaps
the singular affirmation of the churches of congregational polity in
America. "According to the polity of Congregationalism (i.e. Inde-
pendency), which was the pattern of church life in the New England
colonies, any group of like-minded and professed believers have the
right to organize themselves into a church," Dean Sperry observes.
4 3
It is that very notion, basic to the polity of Protestant dissent, supported
politically by the secular humanists, that is the rationalization of sepa-
ration of church and state and of religious liberty. That notion in the
law is theologically partisan, in spite of the gloss of neutrality in which
it is sometimes defended. That is a notion, indeed, which encourages
disunity in the Church. It is a notion that must be challenged insofar
as the Church overcomes the "moral failure" of its denominationalism.
II
POLITY AND LAW:
the variations in denominational polities
The separation of church and state in the United States does not
mean, of course, a policy of absolute isolation of religion and govern-
ment, either institutionally or substantively. As Professor Wilbur G.
Katz has said, "In determining the limits of constitutional separation,
it is the concept of religious freedom which provides the criterion. The
principle of church-state separation is an instrumental principle."' 44 But
separation does categorize the matters in which the law has any concern
or contact with the churches. Generally the law professes no concern
for the doctrines of churches, but it is frequently concerned with the
government of the churches, with the polities of the denominations. 45
The law supposes that theology and polity are severable.
A. The Polities of the Divided Church
Though the Church in the United States is divided as much as it
is, most denominations and sects adhere to some variation of one of the
three common polities---episcopal, presbyterial, or congregational. One
study classifies ninety-nine groups with a congregational polity, seventy-
nine with an episcopal government, and fifty-two with a presbyterial
system, with four bodies which have a military type of organization,
like the Salvation Army, and the remaining denominations either un-
classified or, one suspects, unclassifiable.46  Population-wise, more
4: PFEFFER, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 63.
43 SPERRY 9.
44 KATZ, op. cit. supra note 40, at 97.
-1 Fiske v. Beatty, 120 Misc. 1, 198 N.Y. Supp. 358 (Spec. Term), aff'd as
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American church members belong to denominations governed according
to episcopal polity than both congregational and presbyterial combined.4 7
In churches of episcopal polity, the Bishop is the primary governor
of the church and guardian of its faith and discipline. In no instance,
however, does the Bishop exercise absolute authority or unrestrained
discretion:
[The Bishop] acts within a framework of doctrine and law
that has been transmitted through the Church's life across
the centuries, and it is his duty to adhere to the Church's
teaching as he has received it. He is subject to the authority
and discipline of his brother bishops, and to a pastoral relation-
ship with his clergy and people which places important limi-
tations on what he does and why he does it."'
Episcopal polity is found in a "constitutional" form in some
churches in America in which a voice has been provided for laity and
clergy in matters of doctrine and discipline. 9 Among the principal
churches with one form or another of episcopal polity in the United
States are the Roman Catholic Church, the Eastern Orthodox churches,
the Protestant Episcopal Church, the Old Catholic churches, the Polish
National Catholic Church, the Methodist Church, and the Evangelical
United Brethren Church.5 0
At the other extreme in polity are the denominations and sects of
congregational or independent government, in which each individual
congregation exercises authority in matters of doctrine and discipline.
Each congregation is autonomous, but for practical administration of
common concerns voluntary associations, or in some cases synods, of
representatives of several congregations may exercise powers delegated
to them. 1 Among major groups with a congregational or a congre-
gational-synodical form of government are the several Baptist bodies,
the Congregational Christian Churches, the Disciples of Christ, some of
the Lutheran churches, the Quakers and the Churches of Christ.5 2
The other common Christian polity is presbyterial, in which the
church is governed by presbyters or elders, chosen from and approved
by the members of the congregations, and the ordained ministry in
representative bodies at several levels such as sessions, presbyteries, classes,
synods, and assemblies. "The larger body or a representation of it exer-
cises authority over the smaller, and the representation of the whole
47 Ibid.
4S North American Conference on Faith and Order Document, Section 7,
Authority and Freedom in Church Government 1 (Sept. 9, 1957).
49 Id. at 2.
50 SPERRY 284.
51 North American Conference on Faith and Order Document, Section 7,
supra note 48, at 2.
52 SPERRY 283-84.
[Vol. 20
LAW, POLITY AND REUNION
exerts authority over all the parts." 3 Denominations adhering to presby-
terial polity, in addition, of course, to the several Presbyterian churches,
include the Reformed Church in America, the Evangelical and Re-
formed Church, the Assemblies of God, some of the Lutheran churches,
and the Christian Reformed Church. 4
B. Legal Recognition of a Variety of Polities
Generally speaking the laws of the several states dealing with
religious societies, and the courts of the states, recognize these various
polities, although the statutes and the courts classify variations of polity
in an ingenious number of ways. Ohio law rests upon distinction be-
tween churches with independent polity and those of connected polity,
thereby recognizing that the episcopal and presbyterial polities are much
more proximate to each other than either of them is to the congre-
gational polity."m If Ohio illustrates a jurisdiction with relatively simple
classifications of polity for the purposes of statutory law, New York
illustrates the opposite and contains in its Religious Corporation Law
twenty-three different classifications to accommodate specific denomi-
national requirements or the peculiar requirements of groups of denomi-
nations and sects with sufficient in common to warrant the same
classification.5
6
The courts have tried to maintain that their recognition of various
polities is their concern only insofar as the form of church government
is related to the church or religious society as a legal entity dealing with
"temporal" rather than so-called spiritual affairs."7 And in Harrison v.
Hoyle, in which the court was called upon to determine the successor to
property of the Ohio Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends, after a
factional dispute and schism among Ohio Quakers, the position was
taken that civil courts in order to determine a property question will
adopt the rules and enforce the polity of a denomination in the spirit
and to the effect for which it was designed, and give effect to decisions
of religious judicatories made in conformity with its own polity, provided
that public policy is not thereby contravened.5"
53 North American Conference on Faith and Order Document, Section 7,
supra note 48, at 2.
.54 SPERRY 284.
5 OHio REv. CODE § 1715 (1953).
56 N.Y. REL. CoRP. LAw §§ 40-335. Incorporation of church bodies was first
authorized in New York in 1784. N.Y. LAws 1784, ch. 18. Soon, however, the
policy of the legislature became that of providing especially for separate denomi-
nations, thus fitting the law to requirements of different polities. The first such
enactment was for the Dutch Reformed Church. N.Y. LAws 1788, ch. 61, 11th ses-
sion. The second concerned the Protestant Episcopal Church. N.Y. LAWS 1795,
ch. 25, 18th session.
57 Fiske v. Beatty, supra note 45.
us 24 Ohio St. 254 (1873).
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C. Politics and Polity
It is readily acknowledged at least among theological scholars and
religious sociologists that the polities of the American churches have
evolved in part in response to "pressures characteristic of the American
environment." 9 Dr. Richard Niebuhr puts it bluntly:
The episcopal, presbyterian, and the congregational forms have
each been set forth as representing the original and ideal con-
stitution of the Christian church. Yet the relationship of these
forms to the political experience and desire of various groups
is considerably more pertinent than is their relationship to the
New Testament. Under the social and political conditions of
the American frontier English presbyterianism, which had
been convinced of its fidelity to the New Testament model,
was almost unconsciously transformed into New England
congregationalism, which now defended its form of organ-
ization as following the original and rightful Christian order.
Episcopalianism was defended or attacked at many points in
history, ostensibly because of its alleged maintenance of or
departure from New Testament forms of church adminis-
tration, but in reality because of its relationship to monarchical
and absolute political government.60
Some denominations of congregational polity have rather boasted
of the identity between their polity and their politics, in asserting that
this polity represents democracy at its purest."' And long after colonial
times and disestablishment in some places the town meeting and the
congregational meeting were the same event. 2 The association of con-
gregational polity with democratic politics may turn out to be a decisive
issue in the quest for the reunion of the Church, for the most indi-
vidualistic churches of this tradition are also those who renounce use of
the historic Christian Creeds held in such esteem in the more orthodox
Christian churches, and, in some instances, do not require Baptism.6 3
In that connection it is worth noting as well the identification of
congregational polity and democracy in certain religious bodies in the
United States which do not profess to belong to the Christian Church. 4
Meanwhile, one Bishop of the Church of England has, with some
5 North American Conference on Faith and Order, Section 7, Orientation
Paper of New York Study Group 7 (Sept. 1957).
60 H. RICHARD NIEBUHi, op. cit. supra note 31, at 14-15.
61 DEEMS, The Congregational Christian Churches, in THE AMERICAN1
CHURCH OF THE PROTESTANT HERITAGE 173 (Ferm ed. 1953). See Mitchell v.
Church of Christ, 221 Ala. 315, 128 So. 781 (1930).
62 Petty v. Tooker, 21 N.Y. 267, 8 N.Y. Supp. 270 (1860).
63 MEAD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 77.
64 Neither the Unitarian Church nor the Universalist Church in the United
States adhere to the historic Christian Creeds. Edwin T. Buehrer, former editor
of the Journal of Liberal Religion, suggests that the Unitarians are humanists,
placing "their confidence in the power of the mind and their hope in the integrity
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hostility it is reported, concluded that "all the churches in America,
whatever their polity, are congregational." 6"
The good Bishop may have overstated the consequence of im-
porting the principle of Protestant dissent into the law, of embodying a
preference for independent or congregational polity in the law of
separation and religious liberty.
On one hand, when, as Dr. Niebuhr warns, the denominations
rationalize their politics in their polities, polity is apt to be divorced from
the Gospel. But something like the reverse of that also takes place:
polity becomes public policy. That is apt to mean the severance of polity
from the Gospel, too.
D. The Integrity of Polity in Theology
Yet insofar as the unity of the Church is taken seriously, and
inasmuch as the reunion of the Church is sought, polity must have its
integrity in theology restored. The secularization of the Gospel-the
relegation of polity to a mere gloss for political views and prejudices,
the entanglement of polity with public policy-must be overcome if the
Church is to recover unity. That is likely to require some radical
changes in the denominations, and in the varieties of denominational
polities, but then the reunion of the Church of Christ anticipates a very
radical event.
The complaint of Dr. Niebuhr against polity as political rational-
ization is at the same time a plea for the fidelity of the Church to the
Gospel, and he is among the first to point out that it is too simple and
one-sided to consider that the several polities are utterly corrupted. 66
Each of them retains some recollection of the Gospel and of the early
Church, as well as of the history of the Church down through the
centuries.67 Each maintains that the integrity of polity is in theology,
that is, that both the definition and defense of polity is dependent upon
theology. The way a church is governed and who governs a church is
integral to the faith which a church confesses and represents in the
world. At the Oberlin Faith and Order Conference it was said:
The episcopal polities are grounded in the conviction that
episcopacy is of the esse of the church, and is so inextricably
of human personality." BUEHRER, Unitarianism, in THE AMERICAN CHURCH OF
THE PROTESTANT HERITAGE 159, 161-62 (Ferm ed. 1953). Unitarians identify their
religious doctrine with the Arian heresy of the fourth century and Pelagianism
of the early fifth century. BUEHRER, supra, at 150-51. Cf. CUMMINS, The Uni-
versalist Church of America, in THE AMIERICAN CHURCH OF THE PROTESTANT
HERITAGE 333-47 (Ferm ed. 1953). While these two religious movements have
not participated in ecumenical discussions or negotiations among Christian bodies,
they are presently preparing to merge with each other. See MEAD, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 200-02, 205-07.
65 SPERRY 9.
66 H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, op. cit. supra note 31, at 13-14.
67North American Conference on Faith and Order Document, Section 7,
supra note 48, at 2-5.
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involved in its life and work as to constitute the nucleus, or
heart, without which the whole would die and disintegrate.
Polity is here a reflection of doctrine. A free-church polity,
at least in the summaries presented to the committee, is re-
garded as pragmatic: one of several possible administrative
structures, of indifferent confessional value per se, the selective
principle being demonstrable utility in a given situation. This
position is also doctrinal, possible only with a free-church
ecclesiology, and the free-church polity, or rather the approach
to polity is therefore also doctrinal.6"
From the point of view of the concern for the reunion of the
Church, and from the views of the churches, polity has its integrity in
theology. The law speaks in a different language, disassociating, at
least for certain purposes, polity and theology. Query whether that
dichotomy can be maintained?
III
LAW AND POLITY:
the policy of "multiple establishment"
The American law of separation of church and state and of free-
dom of religion represents, somewhat paradoxically, the insinuation of
a particular confessional theology into public policy, and, at the same
time, that public policy assumes that polity and theology are severable.
Superficially, of course, the supposed dichotomy between polity and
theology, reflected in court decisions and in statutes dealing with religious
societies, sounds like it upholds the separation of state and church. Yet
responsible ecumenical discussion in this country among the churches
denies any dichotomy between polity and theology. 9 Such a denial
challenges anew the notion that the law is neutral toward religion; it
exposes the law as still serving the requirements of the polity of Protes-
tant dissent.
A. Disestablishment and the Incorporation of Churches
The meaning of the establishment of religion has changed since
the First Amendment was drawn. Though there are reports that in
some countries establishment is still associated with the suppression of
non-conforming religious groups, that association no longer applies to
England, from which the precedents for the colonial establishments
were taken. Indeed, some leaders of the established church in England
can be heard to complain that it is the only church there which suffers
under civil disability for the reason that it is established.7"
68 North American Conference on Faith and Order, Section 7, Orientation
Paper of New York Study Group 8 (Sept. 1957).
6 9 THE NATURE OF THE UNITY WE SEEK 206-12 (Minear ed. 1958).
70 On the nineteenth century struggle over disestablishment of the Church
of England, see BROSE, CHURCH AND PARLIAMENT (1959). Disestablishment now
appears to be a dead issue, but redefinition of Church-State relations continues,
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Not only does establishment nowadays carry no necessary associ-
ation with restriction on religious freedom, but, it will be recalled, that
the compatibility of the two was urged and to some extent practiced in
colonial Virginia. 
7 1
Though both in the colonies and nowadays liberal establishments
have been in effect, the Constitutional bar to establishment was given a
strict interpretation. Madison vetoed a bill to incorporate the Protestant
Episcopal Church in the District of Columbia, and said that it would
violate the first amendment. "This particular church, therefore, would
so far be a religious establishment by law, a legal force and sanction
being given to certain articles of its constitution and administration."
7 2
Some states ostensibly follow Madison in considering incorporation
of churches a form of establishment forbidden by the constitution. The
Constitution of Virginia declares that the "General Assembly shall not
grant a charter of incorporation to any church or religious denomi-
nation.""3 West Virginia has the same view. 74 In both states, however,
one suspects contrary to Mr. Madison's intentions, incorporation has been
approved for religious purposes by the courts when a classification was
proposed by the incorporators which could be distinguished, though ever
so slightly, from "church or religious denomination." In 1885, Virginia
incorporated the Protestant Episcopal Education Society, whose purpose
was to provide for seminary training, thus incidentally correcting the
preference of some for tobacco over a learned ministry, nearly two
centuries earlier. 5 West Virginia has held that a missionary society is
not a church, and, therefore, can be incorporated. 6 (Perhaps the real
meaning of the severance of polity and theology is the opposite holding:
a church is not a missionary society!) These decisions, plus the fact that
the state constitutional prohibition of church or denomination corpo-
rations does not in itself inhibit work by a denomination incorporated
elsewhere, means that the practical distinction between states forbidding
and those permitting incorporation of a church are not substantial.
77
for example, in the establishment of the Church Assembly by Act of Parliament
in 1919 which gave the Church of England something like its own legislature.
See NEILL, ANGLICANISM, 391-406 (1958) and The Report of the Archbishopst
Committee on Church and State (1917).
71 See p. 415 and note 20 supra.
72 1 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 489 (1900).
73 VA. CG ST. § 59 (1902).
74 V. VA. CoNST. art. VI, § 47 (1872).
75 Protestant Episcopal Education Society v. Churchmen's Representatives,
80 Va. 718 (1885).
76 Stump v. Sturm, 254 Fed. 535 (4th Cir. 1918). But see Powell v. Dawson,
45 V. Va. 780, 32 S.E. 214 (1899) (incorporation of Baptist missionary society
would violate constitution), and cf. Wilson v. Perry, 29 W. Va. 169, 1 S.E. 302
(1884) (Presbyterian Committee on Publications is not "church or religious
denomination" prohibited from incorporation).
77Trustees of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the
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B. The Religious Corporation and the Churches
Most of the states permit religious societies of several varieties-
congregations, dioceses, synods and the like, missionary or educational
societies, denominations-to incorporate or to create a corporation for
the holding and management of property for religious uses, without
evident anxiety that religious corporations are inconsistent with separation
of church and state and the prescriptions against establishment of
religion. In terms of recognition of the various common polities, the
categorizations of state legislation, as has been hereinbefore noted,
present no uniform pattern."8 At the same time, in several jurisdictions
the decisions indicate that the grant of a corporate charter to a church
by a state restricts its freedom to change polity, which usually means its
denominational affiliation, and to change its confession of faith, an issue
to be examined presently."9
Apart from the effect of incorporation on situations of schism, the
language of the courts develops the dual entities doctrine. As the court
in one celebrated early New York case, Petty v. Tooker, put it:
These two bodies, viz: the corporation and the Church, al-
though one may exist within the pale of the other, are in no
respect correlative. The objects and interests of the one are
moral and spiritual; the other deals exclusively with things
temporal and material.8s
Though Petty was eventually overruled on other grounds, the divisions
between corporation and temporalities on one hand and church and
spiritualities on the other is still fundamental to the law of religious
corporations. In 1940, in Walker Memorial Baptist Church v. Saunders,
the court reiterated the doctrine in New York, "In dealing with religious
corporations, it is necessary to bear in mind that two separate entities are
involved. One is the legal corporation; the other is the spiritual associ-
ation of religious congregants which constitute the church itself.""' In
Ohio, the same theory is advanced in Harrison v. Hoyle.s2  In South
Carolina, the court was more concrete, saying that a religious corpo-
ation is simply a civil institution for the management of property.8 3
U.S. v. Gutherie, 86 Va. 125, 10 S.E. 318 (1889) (North Carolina religious corpo-
ration not barred from Virginia). The Virginia General Assembly is consti-
tutionally authorized to provide for securing the title of any church property.
VA. CONST. § 59 (1902).
78 See p. 421 supra.
79 See p. 421 supra.
80 21 N.Y. 267, 271, 8 N.Y. Supp. 270, 271 (1860).
81 173 Misc. 455, 457, 17 N.Y.S.2d 842, 844 (Sup. Ct. 1940). It was said in
an early New York case that there are not two, but three entities involved:
(1) the church or spiritual body of communicants and ofliciants, (2) the congre-
gation of attendants at worship competent to vote, and (3) the trustees of the
religious corporation. Lawyer v. Cipperly, 7 Paige Ch. 281 (N.Y. 1838).
82 Supra note 58.
83 Wilson v. Presbyterian Church, 2 Rich. Eq. 192 (S.C. 1842).
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When the separate entities doctrine was applied to a question of
whether the members of the religious corporation had to be also mem-
bers of the church which was "within the pale of" the corporation, in
Fiske v. Beatty, the New York court ruled that such membership was
not essential.8 4 And though this may seem on the face of it-to mem-
bers of that church at least--a carrying of entities to extremes, there is
a decision in New York ninety-two years prior to Fiske that holds that a
person who has been expelled from a church may remain a trustee of
the corporation associated with it.8 5
This doctrine of the two entities is used mainly, as one would
expect, as a principle limiting the jurisdiction of the civil courts in liti-
gation involving the churches. As the cases involving both schism in o
church and merger of churches show, the courts accept jurisdiction
where a question involving property rights or civil rights is involved."6
In doing so, however, the courts continually deal with issues of polity,
not only of identifying the polity of a party before it, but of interpreting
that polity, frequently, so as to give it the effect that its confessional
presuppositions require. That happened, for example, in Immaculate
Conception v. Murphy, where a Roman Catholic parish in Nebraska
sought to restrain an excommunicated priest from exercising the office
of priest and to restrain the trustees of the religious corporation from
permitting him access to the parish property to do so." A closely related
case involving an expelled minister gave Nebraska a chance to interpret
a Protestant polity.8 8
C. Separation and the Establishment of Separatism
The author of the First Amendment policy of separation of church
and state and religious liberty advocated a strict disestablishment, in-
cluding denial of corporate charters to churches, but thought favorably
of a multiplicity of sects and denominations.8 "
Yet in coping with the multiplication of churches in America, the
laws of the states have found it or thought it necessary to depart from
strict disestablishment far enough to authorize incorporation of churches
and related religious bodies. That suggests that at some point inde-
pendent polity becomes so individualistic that it degenerates from re-
ligious pluralism into religious anarchy, but it would be very speculative
to impute that as a motive for the laws of religious corporation in the
states. But those laws do represent a recognition of the common polities
84 120 Misc. 1, 198 N.Y. Supp. 358 (Spec. Term) aff'd as modified, 206 App.
Div. 349, 201 N.Y. Supp. 441, aft'd, 238 N.Y. 598, 144 N.E. 907 (1924).
85 Baptist Church in Hartford v. Witherell, 3 Paige Ch. 296 (N.Y. 1832).
86 Baptist Church in Hartford v. Witherell, supra note 85, at 301. See
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 WaIl.) 679 (1872).
87 89 Neb. 52+, 131 N.W. 946 (1911); ef. St. Vincent's Parish v. Murphy,
83 Neb. 630, 120 N.W. 187 (1909).
88Pounder v. Ash, 44 Neb. 672, 63 N.W. 48 (1895).
89 See p. 416 supra.
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among the denominations, something which Madison condemned as
partial establishment, when the attempt was made to incorporate one of
the denominations. The laws of the states on religious corporations
move in the direction of "multiple establishment". Separation means
the establishment of separatism.
What is lacking that has been the traditional characteristic of estab-
lishment in direct government financial support of religion, but in place
of that, in addition to tax concessions and the like, is the jurisdiction of
the courts over church affairs relating to property. To preserve the
nomenclature of separation, and, I suggest, because of the radical indi-
vidualism of religoi in America, the courts in assuming jurisdiction
have invented the dual entities doctrine, which presumes that there is a
dichotomy between "temporal" and "spiritual" issues in the churches
that represents the severability of polity from theology. But it is also a
notion-though familiar in some religions and in classical philosophy-
denounced in the Gospel.9"
IV
LAW, POLITY, AND DIsuNITY:
the sanction of schism
The supposition that polity can be severed from theology and that
therefore the courts can confine themselves to contests involving the
"temporalities" of the church breaks down when the cases involving
factionalism and schism in the churches are considered. Where a
denomination divides into factions, where secession is threatened, where
changes in confession or denominational affiliation are sought, where
changes in polity are attempted-in any of these situations where the
court is required to identify and interpret polity it is demonstrated that
polity and theology cannot be separated. In these situations the question
before the court is which of the disputants is entitled to the church
property, and far more often than not the determination of that question
provides a sanction for schism.
A. Factional Disputes within a Church
As between disputing factions within a church, the legal successor
to the church property is said to be a question of which faction adheres
to the original polity of the church.
Thus, where factionalism reaches the point of division or threat
of secession in a church which has been of presbyterial or episcopal
polity, the property goes to the denomination or to the faction still ad-
hering to the discipline and government of the denomination. In
Presbytery of Bismark v. Allen, a North Dakota congregation re-
nounced the jurisdiction of the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America and voted unanimously to secede and the presbytery of which
90See Romans 1:18-23, and cf. Colossians 1:15-20, Colossians 2:8-15, Psalm
19:1-4, 1 Corinthians 1:18-25, John 1:1-14.
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it had been a member successfully sued for possession of the property
of the congregation:
Where a local religious society holding property is but a sub-
ordinate member of a larger organization with ultimate power
in some supreme judiciary . . . [property] is held in trust for
the general church body and it cannot be used in contravention
of the decisions of the supreme church judiciary. 9 1
Similarly, Ohio provides by statute that property held by the beard of
an endowment fund religious corporation created by a presbytery, synod,
diocesan convention or other representative body of a religious denomi-
nation "shall be applied to the use and benefit of the proper denomination
within this state."9 2
Where there are factional disputes in a church with congregational
polity, the majority of the congregation retain the property of the church,
although in Virginia, where such a provision is incorporated in statute,
the control of the property is subject to court approval.9 3 In a denomi-
nation with congregational polity, where there is schism, each congre-
gation, by majority vote, decides the faction to which the congregation
belongs, and the property follows the decision.94 Even where inde-
pendent polity prevails, however, it may not be exercised in a manner
which impairs the obligation of contract or alters the terms of a trust,
and so where property has been given to a church of congregational
polity and the donor has made the gift for the furtherance of particular
doctrine or confession, the will of the majority faction departing from
that confession may not defeat the duty to the donor.95
B. Change in Denomination or Confession
Where the substance of discord is the attempt to change denomi-
national affiliation or to alter creed or confession of faith, the courts
favor retention of church property by the original denomination or the
adherents to the original confession. Even in churches of congregational
polity this is generally the rule. It has been held that in a church of
congregational polity, the majority is supreme only if faithful to its
custom, usage, faith, and practice, and the majority may not divert
property to another denomination whether or not the property is subject
to an express trust. 6
A century ago the law upheld, in New York, such a diversion.
In Petty v. Tooker the court approved a change of denomination from
Congregationalist to Presbyterian on the grounds that a religious corpo-
ration has no denominational character and that the trustees of the
9174 N.D. 400, 413-14, 22 N.W.2d 625, 631-32 (1946).
92 OHio REv. CoDE § 1715.12 (1953).
93 VA. CODE tit. 57, § 9 (1950).
94 Bunnell v. Creacy, 266 S.W.2d 9S (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
95 Finley v. Brent, 87 Va. 103, 12 S.E. 228 (1890).
9 6 Park v. Chaplin, 96 Iowa 55, 64 N.W. 674 (1895) ; Franke v. Mann, 106
Wis. 118, 81 N.W. 1014 (1900).
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corporation had power to effect a change of denomination. In that case
the court read independent polity into the Religious Corporation Act:
The act for the incorporation of religious societies was ob-
viously framed with a view to, and in accord with, that just
and sound principle which lies at the basis of all our civic
institutions, viz: that in every organized society, the con-
trolling power should be in the hands of the majority. 97
Petty has been interpreted as holding that the diversion of property
could be "from the dissemination of the views of the persons acquiring
it to that of any other view, whether religious or secular, which might
be sanctioned and adopted by a voting majority of the congregation." 98
This doctrine appears in muted form in cases in other jurisdictions,
for example in an Indiana case in 1896, involving a bitter disagreement
over doctrine within a Baptist church, the court indicated that where a
religious corporation holds property for a church with defined theological
doctrine, a change in confession can only be accomplished by unanimous
vote of the members of the congregation.
99
However, the rule today is contrary. In New York, the Petty
formula was changed ,by statute providing that the trustees of a religious
corporation should administer its property for the benefit of the corpo-
ration in accordance to the discipline, usages and rules of the denomi-
nation to which it belongs.' The expulsion by the majority in a
church of congregational polity of a minority who still adhere to the
original faith does not affect the rights of the faithful minority to the
church property.' 1 Coupled with this implied trust in favor of the
original denomination and the propagation of the original confessional
position, in cases involving change of denomination or confession, is the
trust to effectuate the intention of donors of church property. In such
a case, the Indiana court in Lamb v. Cain said that "however delicate
and difficult it may be, it is the duty of the court to inquire whether the
party accused of violating the trust is teaching a doctrine so far at
variance with that intended as to defeat the objects of the trust.,"10 2
C. The Care and Conservation of Schism
Such decisions and statutes as these conserve division in the Church
and sanction the further fragmentation of the Church into sects and
denominations, frequently organized around a single issue.
Public policy, of course, reflecting congregational polity, considers
that religious liberty and religious dissent are virtually the same thing
97 21 N.Y. at 272, 8 N.Y. Supp. at 272.
98 Isham v. Trustees, 63 How. Pr. 465 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1882).
99 Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361, 44 N.E. 363 (1896).
100 N.Y. LAWS 1875, ch. 79, § 4. The same provision is now contained in
N.Y. REL. CoRP. LAW § 5.
101 See Smith v. Pedigo, supra note 99.
102 129 Ind. 486, 510, 29 N.E. 646 (memorandum report) (1891).
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and are anyway essential to each other. Public policy does not condemn
schism. It, on the contrary, encourages it.
At the same time, when factional disputes or attempts to change
denomination or confession come before the courts, the law applies an
implied trust doctrine which works to preserve the polity and doctrine
of the original church or sect. And in the case where church property
has been given for express confessional purposes, the trust provisions
cannot generally be altered or defeated even though the will of the
church is different and even if the trust purposes are not consistent with
the contemporary needs and purposes of the church. This tends to
prolong the survival of factionalism and divisiveness in the church.
The reunion of the Church-or appreciable and responsible ad-
vances toward reunion-will not come about unless the Church trusts
the Gospel enough to resolve its internal differences without resort to
law. The law, as seen in the schism cases, saves the churches from
trusting the Gospel, and, in the name of dealing with "temporalities,"
interprets the confessional basis of those differences. Public policy is
a two-edged sword-an inducement to schism and sectarianism, and a
conservation of the divisions of the past around which denominations or
sects were organized even where the reasons for division no longer
apply or adherents of it are no longer on the scene.
V
LAW, POLITY, AND UNION:
the churches in search of unity
The churches are not ready for the reunion of the Church. Multi-
plication of sects and denominations is still the order of the times-in
spite of the mergers between major denominations in the past several
years and in spite of reunion negotiations and discussions of unity in
progress and in prospect. The recalcitrant minorities which oppose and
abstain from merger agreements usually regroup their strength and
continue as a separate sect. The Church in America is amoebic.
The churches cannot blame the law for their disorder and disunity.
But it can be argued that the law is not ready for the reunion of the
Church either, nor even for approaches to reunion. And the argument
here is just that: the law rests upon a policy which presumes disunity in
the Church and which tends to conserve that disunity and abet dis-
sidence. That, in its own way, is quite as much religious partisanship as
the most conservative establishment of religion.
A. Consolidation and Merger of Churches
That the neutralism of the law toward religion is feigned is as
much apparent when the law deals with cases involving merger and
union of churches as in the schism cases. Indeed, the same doctrines
govern the merger cases.
The law generally abstains from interference with ecumenical re-
1959]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
lations among churches where the formula is a federation of churches
or denominations each of which retains its autonomy and property and
joins in the federation merely for defined cooperative purposes. Such
a federation is the National Lutheran Council, representing the volun-
tary collaboration of several separate Lutheran churches."0 3 And this
is basis upon which some thirty-two Protestant and Eastern Orthodox
denominations work together, more or less cumbersomely, I observe,
in the National Council of Churches of Christ.' And though the mere
fraternization of different denominations in such federations may in the
long run be a preparation for reunion of the Church, one recalls that
good Anglican Bishop's observation that all the American churches are
congregational in polity. For essentially the federative schemes are an
application of that polity in which each constituent unit, here denomi-
nations rather than congregations, retains independence. In any case,
it is not conclusive that federation is a prelude to reunion, it may even
turn out to be contrary-wise, that is, the churches may be so little pre-
pared for reunion that they comfortably accept piece-meal federation as
a substitute for reunion.
The law has upheld amalgamations of local congregations, where
churches continue without loss of their separate identities, each with
their own property, united only by the ministry of the same pastor, but
this, again, is hardly a viable alternative to the Church's reunion and is
tied very much to immediate local conditions. 10 5
Resort to the courts more often arises in cases where two general
denominational bodies merge and protest of the merger is asserted by
a dissident constituent congregation in one of the merging denomi-
nations. In such cases, either where the same or different polities and
confessions are involved, the law tends to encourage division.
B. Merger and Common Polity or Confession
In the merger cases, the dual entities doctrine applies. The courts
say that whether the law of a church permits union with another church
is generally a purely ecclesiastical question not subject to civil review. 10 6
But where churches are incorporated, mergers are subject to legislative
authority and consent just as any other corporations.' 07  Ohio provides
by statute for consolidation of religious corporations in certain instances
where the consolidating corporations recognize the same ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, government, order and discipline, where the trustees of the
103 SPERRY 236. See MEAD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 132-33.
104 See YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN CHURCHES FOR 1959 (Landis ed. 1958). The
predecessor of the National Council of Churches was the Federal Council of
Churches. See SPERRY 231-32.
105 Gladding v. St. Matthew's Church, 25 R.I. 628, 57 Atd. 860 (1904).
106 First Presbyterian Church v. First Cumberland Presbyterian Church,
245 Ill. 74, 91 N.E. 761 (1910).
107 Gladding v. St. Matthew's Church, supra note 105.
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corporations agree on the merger and where two-thirds of the members
of each church ratify the consolidation according to their own laws.
With strict conformance to these requirements, the new entity succeeds
to the property of the churches consolidating.' s This seems to be
mainly applicable to churches of congregational polity, but Ohio also
provided for consolidation of religious corporations where connected,
that is presbyterial or episcopal, polities prevail.0 9 Two or more congre-
gations in the same locality in Ohio can also consolidate whether or not
they are initially incorporated, if they are each self-governing, execute
a written agreement to consolidate and in the consolidated corporation
preserve their identity and common usages."' ° Presumably the latter
provision protects the duty to donors of the consolidating congregations.
Where the disposition of property is involved in a merger, judicial
review may be invoked to safeguard the continuing use of property for
purposes designated by express trust or by a trust by implication. Thus,
in the absence of an express trust, where a church when originally
endowed is subordinate to or connected with some ecclesiastical organ-
ization or particular form of church government it cannot renounce its
faith or denominational affiliations or become independent or unite with
another denomination and still retain the endowment."' The Ohio
statute governing the disposition of church property by trustees of a
religious corporation in favor of the "proper denomination" represents
the same rule."'
Probably the most extensive litigation on merger between denomi-
nations of the same polity and confession arose in connection with the
union of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. and the Cumberland
Presbyterian Church. That merger was contested in nine jurisdictions
by dissident groups in the Cumberland Church mainly on grounds that
the two denominations had differing confessions. The union was upheld
in all but two jurisdictions, the view of the majority being that,
according to presbyterial polity, the decision of the General Assembly
of the Cumberland Church that the two bodies had substantially the
same doctrine was conclusive on the civil court."' The merger was
accomplished, but the dissidents reorganized themselves and continue
to this day as the Cumberland Presbyterian Church." 4 Merger spawned
a new schism.
108 OHIO REV. CODE § 1715.08 (1953).
109 Onto REV. CODE §§ 1715.21-22 (1953).
110 OHro REv. CODE § 1715.10 (1953).
'l Roshi's Appeal, 69 Pa. 462, 8 Am. Rep. 275 (1871); ef. Presbytery of
Bismark v. Allen, 74 N.D. 400, 22 N.W.2d 625 (1946).
112 OHIO REV. CODE § 1715.12 (1953).
113 First Presbyterian Church v. First Cumberland Presbyterian Church,
245 I1. 74, 91 N.E. 761 (1910) ; cf. Ramsey v. Hicks, 174 Ind. 428, 91 N.E. 344
(1910), and Brown v. Clark, 102 Tex. 323, 116 S.W. 360 (1909).
114 MEAD, op. cit. supra note 6 ,at 176-77.
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C. Merger and Diverse Polity or Confession
Generally the statutes do not specifically deal with consolidation
where diverse polity or confession is involved, although in Ohio two or
more denominations, though not necessarily incorporated and though not
of the same confession, may unite, if the union is accomplished unani-
mously, and petition the court for an order to convey the property of
the consolidating bodies, provided the original terms of a donor's grant
are not violated." 5 In a Texas case, Brown v. Clark, the court linked
the approval of mergers between churches of different confessions to
the form of polity of the denominations, suggesting not only that polity
and confession are integral to each other but that such unions depended
upon the authority of the government of a church to alter the confession
of a church. 116
But the most notorious merger case is that of Cadman Memorial
Congregational Society of Brooklyn v. Kenyon, in New York, where a
local congregation sought a declaratory judgment that the General
Council of the Congregational Christian Churches had no authority to
proceed with a merger with another denomination of different polity,
namely, the Evangelical and Reformed Church, which has a presby-
terial polity. Part of the judgment which Cadman sought was that
such congregations as abstained from the merger would be the legal
successors to the property possessed by the General Council worth over
$60,000,000. The court ruled that property in the hands of the
General Council, a constellation of agencies through which local congre-
gations cooperated for common purposes, were unrestricted funds in
which this particular local congregation failed to show a direct interest
that would be violated by the merger. And the court further held that
the General Council had no authority to compel non-assenting congre-
gations to join the union. Cadman could abstain if it wished, but it
could not prevent assenting congregations from joining in the union.1 17
In the merger cases, as in the schism cases, the law tends to up-
hold the polity and confession of the original denomination, the law
tends to conserve its position against modification, but at the same time
fundamental public policy encourages dissidents to constitute themselves
as "new" sects or denominations. Almost every merger case is also a
schism case.
VI
LAw, THE CHURCHES, AND THE CHURCH:
public policy v. the Prospect of reunion
The accommodation of pluralism and freedom in American society
115 OHIO REv. CODE § 1715.09 (1953).
116 Brown v. Clark, supra note 113.
117 Cadman Memorial Congregational Society of Brooklyn v. Kenyon, supra
note 10.
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consists not in the abolition of controversy, but, on the contrary, in the
maturity and content of controversy under the rule of law. The ap-
proach of the churches to reunion threatens a great deal of controversy,
not only within and among the several churches, but also within the
whole of society, and also between the churches and society. Reunion
may provoke as much controversy as Reformation. If that controversy
is avoided, the law will grow static and obsolete; if that controversy is
feared, the law will be corrupted by evasion; if that controversy is sup-
pressed, the law will be subverted.
Just as the present policy of the law toward the churches, styled
here as "multiple establishment," represents substantial departure from
the doctrine of disestablishment of the early United States, just so that
policy and its presumption of continued Christian disunity becomes anti-
quated insofar as the churches reunite.
The first and fundamental recognition in controversy about the
law of church-state relations must be that public policy in America has
never been neutralist toward the churches. Public policy was not neutral
either in the theocracy of colonial New England or in the liberal estab-
lishment of the crown colonies. It was not neutral in the first amend-
ment disestablishment, nor in the subsequent state disestablishments, but
embodied a partisanship for independent polity, a preferment which sur-
vives today.
Part of the fiction of neutralism of the law toward the churches
is the supposition that polity and theology are severable, that is, that
polity concerns the handling of the temporal as opposed to spiritual
affairs of the churches and that the government of the church is a
pragmatic issue. Yet ecumenical conversations now taking place chal-
lenge the notion that polity can be severed from theology and join in
the view indicated by Dr. Richard Niebuhr that the recovery of in-
tegrity and unity in the Church requires the constitution or reconsti-
tution of polity in terms responsible to the content of the Gospel. In
short, reunion of the Church contemplates an integral relationship of
polity and theology which essentially and radically contradicts the polity
preferred by, embodied in, and rationalized in the public policy of
church-state relations in America. The theology of unity challenges the
theology of dissent. The theology of unity threatens public policy
which presupposes the theology of separatism.
But since there is, indeed, no neutralism in public policy, the
question posed by the prospect of reunion becomes one of whether the
law's bias should differ from that which it has been. Will any other
bias imperil religious freedom?
There is apparently great apprehension that it would, and the
spectre of theocratic government is trotted out by the debaters to defend
the present partisanship of the law. Yet even in colonial America it was
clear that theocratic government was not the only or necessary alterna-
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tive in public policy. Even in colonial America where the church had
enough cohesiveness and unity to secure establishment, that establish-
ment was not necessarily inconsistent with freedom for religious dissent
and non-conformity. And, as has been noted, in other countries which
are democracies today, establishment and religious freedom are compati-
ble. Just as a multiplicity of political parties does not in itself guarantee
political freedom, much less stability, civic maturity, or national unity,
so also a multiplicity of religious sects is not an essential guarantee of
freedom of religion. Mr. Madison-I suggest because of his own
religious partisanship-was mistaken.
The only attempt of the present paper is to suggest that insofar
as present public policy inhibits the reunion of the Church, it lies within
the vocation and witness of the Church to contest those inhibitions, and
further, that any serious quest for unity by the churches in America
will bring the churches into increasing conflict with a public policy
which favors separatism and conserves schism. As that conflict emerges,
the law of church-state relations will surely be reshaped-perhaps even
drastically reconstructed. Query whether the reunion of the Church
will be substantial and essential enough to warrant a public policy of
re-establishment of the Church in America?
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